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Résumé :  
 
La théorie économique suppose souvent l’influence simultanée sur la fécondité d’effets de coûts 
d’opportunité de l’enfant et d’effets de contrainte financière. La présente analyse vise à tester 
l’existence simultanée de ces deux types d’effets à partir des réponses à une enquête originale réalisée 
en 2003 auprès d’environ 1000 salariés français et renseignant sur leur renoncement à un ou des 
enfants supplémentaire(s). L’analyse statistique est réalisée avec une approche « toutes choses égales 
par ailleurs » via l’estimation de modèles logistiques. Les résultats des estimations apportent une forte 
confirmation à la présence simultanée de ces deux types d’effets.  
 
Mots clés : Taille de Famille, Fécondité, Conciliation Travail-Famille 






Economic theory often assumes that the opportunity costs of having a child and financial 
constraints have a simultaneous but opposite influence on fertility. This empirical paper aims to 
test the concomitance of these effects using the answers to an original survey carried out in 2003 
amongst nearly 1,000 French employees, giving information about the impact of their working 
schedule on the number of children they intend to have. The statistical analysis, based on a 
“ceteris paribus” approach using Logit estimates, strongly confirms the simultaneous presence 
of these two explanatory dimensions.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The question of fertility determinants has been abundantly addressed in the literature. Apart from the 
personal satisfaction derived from having children, numerous factors are usually stressed, in particular 
(i) the direct cost of a child, in other words a financial constraint that would justify appropriate 
measures being taken in terms of family policy, and (ii) the opportunity cost of having a child, that is, 
the discounted cost associated with professional career gaps, themselves brought about by the presence 
of children and time spent bringing them up (cf. Becker, 1991, and, for a survey of literature, Laroque 
and Salanié, 2005).  
 
A recent survey on quality of life and family life carried out by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions in 28 European countries pointed out that one third of 
the women interviewed had not attained their desired number of children (cf. Fahey and Spéder, 2004), 
and that this was especially true for well-qualified women. This observation, already highlighted in 
previous works (cf. for instance Quesnel-Vallée and Morgan, 2004), seems to confirm the existence of 
opportunity costs. Financial constraints stem from high-income households’ ability to more easily 
delegate part of childcare and education to service providers (childminders, day nurserys, etc.). 
Opportunity costs increase with socio-economic status and income, while financial constraints decrease 
with them. The simultaneous and opposite influence of these two variables on fertility has been 
frequently modelled in a theoretical context (cf. for instance Apps and Rees, 2004), but rarely 
corroborated by empirical studies. In industrialized countries, the strong rise over the last few decades 
in women’s average level of education has inflated opportunity costs, thereby giving an incentive to 
implement family policies aimed at maintaining or raising fertility rates (Cf. Iyigun, 1996).  
 
Interactions between fertility and female labour supply are complex (cf. Angrist and Evans, 1998, 
Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir, 2004, and Laroque and Salanié, 2005):  
 
-  The analyses on individual data seem to rely particularly on specifications and data 
sources. On the basis of French data, Laroque and Salanié (2005) point out that family 
policies consisting of financial transfers would have a significant impact on fertility, but 
also report that their previous evaluations based on cruder specifications led to different 
conclusions (a very weak, or conversely, a greater impact). Using US data, Angrist and 
Evans (1998) demonstrated that the higher the socio-economic status, the less women 
leave the labour market after having a child, which indirectly confirms the existence of 
opportunity costs. Other papers, like Powell (1998) or Connely and Kimmel (2003) on 
Canadian and US data respectively, have shown that the labour market participation of 
women that have at least one child increases with their potential wage (associated with 
level of education and professional experience, among other variables), thereby bearing 
out opportunity costs, but decreases with the cost of childcare, corroborating the presence 
of financial constraints. An important study by Chun and Oh (2002) on Korean data finds 
that fertility appears to be influenced positively by income (financial constraint), but 
negatively by level of education (opportunity costs).  
 
-  Using macroeconomic data, Brewster and Rindfuss (2000) have shown that the correlation 
between fertility rates and female participation rates, which used to be negative, has 
become strongly positive in recent years: since the 1990s, OECD countries (and in 
particular European Union-15 countries) that have the lowest fertility rates are also those 
that display the lowest female participation rates (e.g. Spain, Greece and Italy). By 
contrast, among industrialised countries, the United States is the one in which adult women 
are both the most fertile and the most economically active. With these macroeconomic 
data, the average financial constraint is very indirectly assessed by GDP per capita, an   4  
approach which is open to criticism. In less developed countries with low GDP per capita, 
the means and culture of contraception are less widespread. Moreover, children may be 
substituted for non-existent retirement insurance, which can lead to a negative correlation 
between GDP per capita and fertility. However, within a cross-country framework, 
Panopoulou and Tsakloglou (1999) indicated that fertility appears to increase with GDP 
per capita but to decrease with women’s average level of education, corroborating the 
opposite effects of financial constraint and opportunity costs. Lorgelly, Knowles and Owen 
(2001) found quadratic relations between these variables, thus signifying a more complex 
relation.  
 
The simultaneous influence on fertility of opportunity costs and financial constraint is here tackled 
through an empirical analysis of the determinants of the number of children people intend to have (if 
any). This paper investigates the answers of nearly 1,000 French employees to a survey carried out in 
2003 by the IPSOS Institute for Chronopost. The survey consists of specific questions related to the 
number of children people choose to have. To capture these factors effectively, numerous variables of 
this database are taken into account simultaneously, evaluating their ceteris paribus influence by 
means of estimates of logistic models. Although interesting results can be drawn from this approach, a 
complete analysis is seemingly difficult to provide. Indeed, this survey only deals with employees, and 
consequently ignores those (women, in particular) who have given up paid employment because of the 
difficulty of reconciling work and family life. Moreover, a number of cultural factors that are central to 
this kind of issue are left out (e.g. sharing of domestic tasks). A detailed presentation of this survey and 
its main outcomes is provided in Cette, Dromel and Méda (2005).  
 
 
2.  Data and the “ceteris paribus” approach 
 
The IPSOS–Chronopost survey on reconciling work and family life, carried out between June and July 
2003, interviewed 999 employees, out of 2,009 representative individuals of the French population 
over the age of 15. The representative nature of the sample was guaranteed by the quota method, based 
on gender, age, head of household and interviewee’s occupations, following stratification by region 
and size of agglomeration. Employees were interviewed at home by telephone. The survey’s 
questionnaire was drawn up by a team of experts. After eliminating “non-replies”, the sample was 
reduced to 955 employees. The question about the number of children people choose to have is 
formulated as follows:  
 
“According to you, overall, the effect of your working schedule on the number of children you intend to 
have is: very significant, quite significant, not very significant, or not significant at all?” 
 
Estimating logistic models makes it possible to characterise the “ceteris paribus” statistical relationship 
between binary explanatory variables and a variable of interest, in this case the answer to the question 
about choices regarding children. As the four possible answer modalities can clearly be ranked in 
order, the polytomous ordered Logit specification was chosen. A Score test for the “proportional odds 
assumption” confirmed this choice. In logistic estimates, for each explanatory variable, one modality is 
selected as the reference category, and is opposed to other item(s). For regressors that can take several 
modalities (e.g. number of children), one of the extreme modalities (no child) is selected as the 
reference category and is opposed to each other modality. Lastly, for continuous modalities (e.g. 
monthly household income) brackets of possible answers were constructed. Household financial 
constraints are taken into account by means of variables of monthly income. The opportunity cost of 
having a child in terms of a professional career can be captured by socio-economic status or education 
variables.  
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Estimates of five models are presented, distinguished by the nature and the number of selected 
explanatory dimensions: monthly household income in model 1; socio-economic status in model 2; 
level of education in model 3; household income and socio-economic status in model 4; and all 
selected state variables except for level of education in model 5. 
 
Education variables, which proved to be non-significant both for model 3 and preliminary estimates of 
model 5, were neglected. Furthermore, the specific nature of the French education system (in which 
study continues at “Grandes Ecoles”, universities and vocational training institutions for the same 
number of years after the baccalauréat), can make the identification of opportunity costs extremely 
complex. The at first sight possible colinearity between household income and socio-economic status 
modifies neither the stability of the results nor their robustness. Previous estimates of Model 5, which 
did not include household income or socio-economic status, showed that taking both dimensions in the 
list of regressors only marginally affects the estimate coefficients, without distorting good-fitting (LR, 
Wald, Score), good-specification and predictive capacity (percent concordant) tests. In addition, some 
explanatory variables initially used were excluded from final estimates, either because of a lack of 
significance, or to minimize risks of endogeneity and mechanical redundancies with respect to other 
dimensions (economic sector, company size, spouse’s socio-economic status etc.). Lastly, the first 
estimates of Model 5 showed the value of crossing gender and age variables, rather than juxtaposing 
them. Thus, while men and women aged between 15 and 30 appear not to feel differently about the 
impact of their working schedule on their desired number of children, this similarity does not seem to 
hold true for older people.  
 
 
3.  The Results  
 
Estimate outcomes tend to show that (Cf. Table):  
 
-  The lower the monthly household income, the greater the impact of working schedules on 
the desired number of children (Model 1). The assumption according to which financial 
constraints influence fertility is corroborated;  
-  The higher the employee’s socio-economic status, the stronger the influence of his/her 
working schedule on the desired number of children (Model 2). The assumption according 
to which the opportunity costs of having a child influences fertility is also corroborated; 
-  The two previous results are slightly reinforced when both explanatory dimensions are 
taken into account simultaneously (Model 4 compared with Models 1 and 2). This result 
suggests that, in view of the negative correlation between the two, financial constraint 
effects on fertility can be underestimated if opportunity cost effects are not studied 
simultaneously; 
-  Young people (irrespective of their gender) report more frequently than other employees a 
strong impact of their working schedule on their desired number of children (Model 5). 
Note that women over 40 still report this impact, though less significantly; 
-  Employees without children report more frequently than others a strong impact of their 
working schedule on their desired number of children (Model 5); 
-  Full-time employees report more frequently than others (those in part-time employment, 
and even more so if this part-time employment is not a choice) a strong impact of their 
working schedule on their desired number of children (Model 5); 
-  Employees that have spouse who works report more frequently than others a strong 
impact of their working schedule on their desired number of children (Model 5). 
 
 
4. Concluding remarks    6  
 
After Chun and Oh (20002) analysis on Korean data the present paper brings, on original individual 
French data, a new direct empirical confirmation of simultaneous opportunity costs and financial 
constraints effects on fertility. These results may feed discussions on government policies aimed at 
raising fertility, the cornerstone of which is improving the balance between work and family life. But 
these policies should not be restricted to financial aspects: some complementary estimates (cf. Cette, 
Dromel and Méda, 2005) have also shown an impact on fertility of difficulties reconciling work and 
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Table: Polytomous Logit Estimates 
Impact of working schedules on the number of children (if any) people intend to have 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
  Coeff.  Wald  Coeff.  Wald  Coeff.  Wald  Coeff.  Wald  Coeff.  Wald 
Monthly household income, in euro                
Less than 1 143  Ref.  Ref.          Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
From 1 143 to 1 982  -0.374  4.12**         -0.424  5.16**  -0.353  3.34* 
From 1 982 to 3 048  -0.613  10.21***          -0.708 12.78*** -0.665  9.82*** 
3 048 and more  -0.487  6.18**         -0.630  9.11***  -0.581  6.56** 
Socio-economic status              
Farmer, craftsman, tradesman, company manager          0.264  0.22     
Senior executive     0.292  2.13     0.483  5.15**  0.328  2.21 
Middle ranking executive     0.355  4.32**     0.493 7.77*** 0.411  4.73** 
Clerk     0.410  5.78**     0.449 6.81*** 0.346  3.31* 
Worker      Ref. Ref.      Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Level of education                    
Less than French “baccalauréat”         Ref.  Ref.        
Baccalauréat and Bac + 2 years                   
University Undergraduate Degree         0.402  5.08**         
M.A., Ph.D., French “Grandes Ecoles”                   
Gender and Age                   
Men aged between 15 and 29                  0.884  12.79*** 
Men aged between 30 and 39                  Ref.  Ref. 
Men aged between 40 and 49                   
Men aged 50 and older                   
Women aged between 15 and 29                 1.021  16.11*** 
Women aged between 30 and 39                  0.539  6.08** 
Women aged between 40 and 49                  0.399  2.68 
Women aged 50 and older                 0.430  2.09 
Number of children                   
No children                  Ref.  Ref. 
1 children                  -0.416 5.55** 
2 children                 -0.287  2.38 
3 or more children                    
Working Time                   
Full Time                  Ref.  Ref. 
Voluntary part-time                  -0.355  2.45 
Involuntary part-time                    
Presence of a Spouse and his/her Occupation                   
No spouse, or spouse without a job                 Ref.  Ref. 
Spouse working part-time                 0.398  6.52** 
Spouse working full-time                 0.394  2.27 
Intercepts              
 “this impact is not at all significant”  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Réf.  Réf.  Réf.  Réf. 
 “this impact is not very significant”  -1.530  85.16***  -2.217  209.10***  -2.023  250.03***  -1.830 89.06*** -2.291 79.55*** 
  “this  impact  is  quite  significant”  -0.309  4.01**  -1.001 54.74*** -0.808  56.96*** -0.602 10.88*** -1.026 17.38*** 
 “this impact is very significant”  0.379  6.04**  -0.314  5.69**  -0.121  1.37  0.093  0.260  -0.294  1.45 









<.0001  LR P-value   0.0143  0.1659  0.1123  0.0050  <.0001 
Score P-value   0.0148  0.1812  0.1051  0.0052  <.0001 
Wald  P-value    0.0129 0.1635 0.1138 0.0058 <.0001 
Score Test for the Proportional Odds Assumption 
P-value 
0.03623 0.0453 0.1077 0.0728 <.0001 
Percent Concordant  41.2  40.5  37.6  53.0  66.0 
- Reference categories in the estimates are indicated by “Ref.”. 
- The different estimates are distinguished by chosen regressors. Selected explanatory dimensions are, apart from the constant terms: in model 
1, monthly household income; in model 2, socio-economic status; in model 3, the level of education; in model 4, monthly household income 
and the socio-economic status; in model 5, all selected state variables except the level of education. 
- The Wald statistic is the square of the Student statistic. If its value is higher than 4, it means that the estimate coefficient is significant at the 
5% level. Estimate coefficients are significant at the 1% level if ***, 5% if **, 10% if * and 20% otherwise. Estimate coefficients that are 
non-significant at the 20% level are not reported. 
- Interpretation example: According to models 1, 4 and 5, an increase in monthly household income would make the decision not to have 
(additional) children - ceteris paribus - less likely.  
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